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LABOR LAW
HERBERT B. MINTZ*

Legal issues, of course, ought to be resolved on the highest of intellectual
planes taking into account only relevant matters of fact, logic and law.
Frequently, however, subconscious attitudes on matters involving social and
economic policy enter into and unwittingly influence the analytical process.
So it is with all mere humans, including members of the National Labor
Relations Board, whether appointed by an Eisenhower or a Kennedy
administration.
This article will be presented in the following format:
I.

BASIC LEGISLATION

(1935-59)

A. Wagner Act
B. Taft-Hartley Act
C. Landrum-Griffin Act
II.

DOCTRINE OF FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION

A. Jurisdiction: Subject Matter and Remedy
B. Florida Cases
C. Jurisdiction: Interstate Commerce
III.

UNION SECURITY

A. Hot Cargo, Union Label and Subcontracting
B. Hiring Halls
C. The Right to Work and The Agency Shop
IV.

STRIKES, PICKETING AND

BOYCOTTS

A. Picketing for Organization or Recognition Purposes

B.

1.

CURTIS BROTHERS

2.

SECTION

3.

FLORIDA LAW

8(b)(7)

Secondary Boycotts
1.

THE LOOPHOLE AND THE AMENDMENTS

2.

AT PRIMARY PREMISES

C. JurisdictionalDisputes
V.

VI.
*

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

(Tactics and Good Faith)

ARBITRATION

Member of the Florida Bar; Corporate Labor Attorney; formerly General Attor-

ney, National Labor Relations Board.
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. BAsIc LEGISLATION (1935-59)
For those lawyers who have little acquaintance with labor law this
survey begins by reviewing some legislation which is rudimentary to this
area.
A. Wagner Act
In 1935 Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act, also known
as the Wagner Act.' This act established the administrative agency known
as the National Labor Relations Board, 2 headquartered in Washington with
regional offices operating throughout the country.3 The heart of the act
is in section 7, which protects and establishes the right of employees to form,
join or assist labor organizations and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. The act provides in section 8 that certain
acts of employers which interfere with section 7 rights are unfair labor
practices for which appropriate remedies will issue. The act further establishes a procedure for elections to determine whether or not a labor organization represents a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit for
the purposes of collective bargaining.
B. Taft-Hartley Act
The next major piece of labor legislation, passed in 1947, was the Labor
Management Relations Act, also known as the Taft-Hartley Act. 4 Title I
of the act amended the 1935 National Labor Relations Act. It declared
certain practices of labor organizationsto be unfair labor practices;5 increased
the size of the Board from three to five members;6 and separated the prosecuting functions of the Board from the judicial functions and put the
former into the Office of the General Counsel. 7 Other titles of the act
established: (1) the-Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service;8 (2) a
procedure to handle national emergency disputes; 9 and (3) opened up
federal courts to suits for breach of contract by or against labor organiza-

1. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1958).
2. NLRA § 3(a), 49 Stat. 451 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1958).
3. At the present time the Board has twenty-eight offices. The Florida regional
office is located at Tampa and there are field offices at Jacksonville and Miami.
4. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1958).
5. NLRA as amended by the LMRA § 8(b), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as further
amended by the LMRDA § 704(a), 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1958),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (Supp. II, 1961).
6. NLRA as amended by the LMRA § 3(a), 61 Stat. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §

153(a) (1958).
7.
amended
amended,
8.
9.

NLRA as amended by the LMRA § 3(d), 61 Stat. 139 (1947), as further
by' LMRDA § 703, 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1958), as
29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (Supp. II, 1961).
LMRA § 202(a), 61 Stat. 153 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 172(a) (1958).
LMRA §§ 206-10, 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-80 (1958).
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tions, regardless of the amount in controversy, and without regard to the
citizenship of the parties. 10 The act further provided concurrent jurisdiction
in state and federal courts for damage actions arising out of certain, types
of secondary boycotts, jurisdictional and sympathy strikes or picketing,"
12
and put certain restrictions on payments to employee representatives.
C. Landrum-Griffin Act
The next major overhaul in our labor laws took place when Congress
passed the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, also
known as the Labor Reform Law, or the Landrum-Griffin Act.' 3 The act
is a direct result of two and one-half years of investigations made by Senator
John L. McClellan's committee on improper activities in the labor-management field. Although the committee investigated many unions and
employers, the legislation largely reflects the committee's concern for the
activities of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
This act for the first time provides the federal government with a major
role in the policing of the internal affairs of labor organizations. It substantially abrogates the common law rules of voluntary associations by giving
members effective enforceable rights against the union.14 The act is
designed to assure members of labor organizations certain rights of democratic procedure in the conduct of the internal affairs of the union. It
regulates the use of the trusteeship as a form of control by internationals
over locals; 5 requires that union elections, at all levels, meet certain minimum statutory standards; 16 and provides that persons with certain felonious
17
or communist backgrounds cannot serve in responsible union positions.
To prevent corruption, the act prohibits certain monetary payments to
unions and further requires reports from unions, employers and labor consultants.' 8 It provides that union officers and agents are to be considered
fiduciaries and that they must file reports on conflict of interests.' 9 It
10. LMRA § 301, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
11. LMRA § 303, 61 Stat. 158 (1947), as further amended by the LMRDA §
704(e), 73 Stat. 545 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1958), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 187
(Supp. II, 1961).
12. LMRA § 302, 61 Stat. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1958).
13. 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. II, 1961).
14. LMRDA § 102, 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 412 (Supp. II, 1961).
15. LMRDA §§ 301-06, 73 Stat. 530 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-66 (Supp. II, 1961).
16. LMRDA §§ 401-03, 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-83 (Supp. II, 1961).
17. LMRDA § 504, 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. II, 1961).
In State v. Smith, 123 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1960) the Florida Supreme Court found
no conflict of authority or jurisdiction between this federal statute and FLA. STAT. §
447.04 (1961), which is a union business agent licensing statute.
18. LMRDA §§ 201-10, 73 Stat. 524 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-40 (Supp. II,
1961); LMRA as amended by the LMRDA § 505, 73 Stat. 537 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 186
(Supp. II,1961).
19. LMRDA § 501, 73 Stat. 535 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 501 (Supp. II, 1961).
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further provides that union financial and administrative operations are to be
20
made public by filing full reports.
Enforcement of the policies of the act is accomplished in various ways.
2
For violation of some sections the only remedy is by private civil action; 1
2
2
violation of other sections may lead to criminal prosecution; and other sections are administered and enforced by the Secretary of Labor 23 and a newly
24
created government agency, the Bureau of Labor-Management Reports.
The drafters of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
were aware of the confusion that might develop between state and federal
authorities when the federal government legislates on a subject previously
regulated by the states. In an effort to avoid any judicial misconstruction
of the intent of Congress, the drafters specifically stated in several sections
whether or not the authority of the states was to be precluded or
25
pre-empted.
This awareness of the problems brought about by state and federal
authorities both seeking to regulate the same subject matter was not present
when the Taft-Hartley Act was passed.
II.

DOCTRINE OF FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION

When Congress in 1947 proscribed certain union activities as unfair
labor practices, it, to some uncertain degree, pre-empted the authority of
the states to regulate union strikes and picketing. The scope of this pre-emption is being resolved on a case by case basis and the path is not always the
straightest. In any event, to determine whether the holdings in state court
labor cases are still current, at least two dates should be considered: April
20, 1959, the date of the United States Supreme Court's second decision in
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,26 which dealt with jurisdiction
based on subject matter; and November 14, 1959, the effective date of
Title VII of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, which
27
relates to jurisdiction based on interstate commerce.

20. LMRDA
21. LMRDA
22. LMRDA
(1959), 29 U.S.C.

§ 205, 73 Stat. 528 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 435 (Supp. 11, 1961).
§ 102, 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 412 (Supp. 11, 1961).
§§ 209, 501(c), 502, 504, 602, 610, 73 Stat. 529, 536, 539, 541
§§ 439, 501(c), 502, 504, 522, 530 (Supp. II, 1961).

23. LMRDA §§ 208, 210, 304, 401(h), (i), 402, 601, 73 Stat. 529, 530, 531, 533,

534, 539 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 438, 440, 464, 481(h), (i), 482, 521 (Supp. II, 1961).
24. Bureau of Labor Management Reports, 29 C.F.R. §§ 401.1-53.25 (Supp. 1961).

25. LMRDA §§ 102, 103, 403, 603, 604, 73 Stat. 523, 534, 540 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 412, 413, 483, 523, 524 (Supp. II, 1961); LMRA as amended by the LMRDA §

701(a), 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (Supp. II, 1961).
26. 359 U.S. 236 (1959), reversing 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958), hearing
on remand 353 U.S. 26 (1957), vacating and remanding 45 Cal. 2d 657, 291 P.2d 1
(1955).
27. LMRA as ,mended by the LMRDA § 701(a), 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§ 164 (Supp. II, 1961).
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It should be borne in mind that the jurisdiction of the Board is based
upon two factors both of which must be present: (1) the factual situation
must show a subject matter within the scope of the protection or prohibitions of the act (jurisdiction based on subject matter); and (2) the factual
situation must also involve an employer whose business volume is adequate
to affect interstate commerce as defined by the Board's standards (jurisdiction based on interstate commerce). In such cases the Board has primary
and exclusive jurisdiction. For a few years however, it was thought that
there could be initial and concurrent court (state or federal) jurisdiction
notwithstanding the presence of the above jurisdictional factors, if the
remedy being sought was a remedy not provided by the National Labor
Relations Board. This idea received considerable encouragement as a result
of the Supreme Court's first decision in the Garmon case. However, by the
time of the second decision in the Garmon case five Justices were persuaded
that rather than allowing initial and concurrent court jurisdiction to exist
based upon distinctions pertaining to remedy, it would be better first to get
a determination from the National Labor Relations Board concerning
whether the subject matter of the case was protected or prohibited by federal
law. In that way, thought the five Justices, there would be less conflict
between the courts and the NLRB in the administration of federal law. To
get the full import of the Court's treatment of these issues, the Garmon
cases are presented in the following section in more detail.
A.

Jurisdiction: Subject Matter and Remedy

In the Garmon case, a union that did not represent a majority of the
employees had asked an employer for recognition and for a union shop
contract. The employer refused to grant the union's demands and the
union started picketing ostensibly to organize the employees. The employer's
business did have an effect upon interstate commerce, but not in sufficient
amount to warrant the National Labor Relations Board to exercise its
jurisdiction. The state court, however, did take jurisdiction and issued an
injunction against the union and awarded damages in favor of the employer.
Upon review, the Supreme Court held that since the employer's business
did have some effect upon interstate commerce, the state court had no
jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief; 28 it is immaterial that the National
Labor Relations Board would not exercise its jurisdiction to handle the case.
This interpretation and application of the doctrine of pre-emption was
not welcomed for it created a situation in which a legal wrong could continue
without appropriate legal remedy being available.
28. This pre-emption of state court jurisdiction did not preclude the state courts

from issuing injunctive relief in situations involving violence or threats of violence, even

though the subject matter was covered (and prohibited) by the NLRA, as amended.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XVI

On the award of damages, the Supreme Court did not invoke the
doctrine of pre-emption, but rather by its remand implied that this was a
possible area for jurisdiction in the state court. The Court remanded the
case for a clarification as to whether the damage award was based upon
a violation of federal or local law.
Tihis remand on the damage issue as well as some other holdings of
the Court 29 had caused other courts"0 and attorneys to infer that state
courts had jurisdiction to award damages when the subject matter was
tortious or unlawful under state law. This approach was further premised
upon the fact that the federal remedial scheme as administered by the
National Labor Relations Board does not provide for any damage remedy
to employers or unions. (Back pay is a form of damage remedy issued by
the Board, but it is awarded only to remedy the losses of employees.)
It was in this context that the California Supreme Court upon remand
set aside the injunction, but sustained the damage award based upon a
violation of state law.31
The United States Supreme Court upon its second review of the
Garmon3 2 case was now ready to pass upon an issue which Justice Frankfurter inferred was not necessary to decide upon the first review: Did
the state court have jurisdiction to award damages arising out of peaceful
union activity which it could not enjoin? In answering this issue the
Court shattered the idea that there was an area for initial state court
jurisdiction based upon a damage remedy and held that the state court
had no jurisdiction to award damages (or any other remedy) because the
applicability of the act to the subject matter first should be determined
by the National Labor Relations Board.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a rather lengthy majority opinion, reviewed
some of the jurisdictional problems and history involved in state-federal
labor relations. He emphasized that the Court has been most concerned
with avoiding areas of potential conflict of substantive law, legal remedy
or administration. He acknowledged that in the past the Court had concentrated its attention on the subject matter of the dispute rather than
the method of regulation or remedy. In stating the Court's holding, he
explained that when a case or subject matter is even arguably subject to the
29. The Supreme Court had sustained state court jurisdiction to render damage
awards in cases within the NLRB's jurisdiction. See UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634
(1958); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); United
Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
30. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. Warehousemen Union, 163 Cal. App. 2d 771, 330
P.2d 53 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Pierce v. Otis Elevator Co., 331 P.2d 481 (Okla. 1958);
Baumgartner's Elec. Co. v. De Vries. 77 S.D. 273, 91 N.W.2d 663 (1958).
31. Carmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473
(1958).
32. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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protection or prohibitions of the act, the state and federal courts must yield
to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board. After
stating this doctrine, Justice Frankfurter acknowledged that the National
Labor Relations Board has no authority to award damages for this type
of union activity and is limited to the issuance of injunctive relief; however,
this did not alter the Court's rationale that allowing a state court primary
jurisdiction to determine the legality of the subject matter, arguably protected or prohibited 3 by federal law, may frustrate national labor policy.
The rationale of a four man concurring opinion written by Mr. Justice
Harlan 34 reveals a substantial difference in the approach to the doctrine
of pre-emption. The concurring opinion reasoned that the state court
damage award should be set aside because the union's activity may be
protected under the National Labor Relations Act. On the other hand,
the Justices disagreed with the majority opinion in that they saw no need
to invoke the doctrine of pre-emption when it is clear that the activity
involved is not protected by federal law. A fortiori, the four Justices believed
that there is jurisdiction in the state court to issue a damage remedy when
activity is specifically prohibited by both state and federal law without
initial resort to the National Labor Relations Board. They were of the
opinion that the reason for the existence of concurrent jurisdiction rests upon
the fact that the remedy provided in the federal act for some types of
violations is inadequate. In these circumstances, the four Justices disagreed
with the majority that there is any expression of congressional intent in the
National Labor Relations Act to pre-empt the authority of the states to
issue an effective remedy.
These comments of Justice Harlan strike at the root of the problem
so far as the plaintiffs are concerned. His approach is more sympathetic
to the necessity of having effective remedies available whenever there is no
clear conflict with federal law. The need, at this time, for this approach
becomes increasingly clear as one realizes the present sparsity and ineffectiveness of many of the National Labor Relations Board's remedial procedures. Justice Frankfurter on the other hand is more concerned with
33. The concept of "protected" activity refers to the job protection given to
emPloyees to engage in activities enumerated in § 7 of the NLRA (see note 75 infra).
This concept is not intended to protect activities of employers or unions, as such, a distinction frequently overlooked. The rest of the act is designed to implement these
employee rights. To that end, employees are protected against certain employer or union
conduct enumerated in §§ 8(a) and (b) of the act which trespasses upon their employment rights or tenure.
The concept of "prohibited" activities refers to activities of employers or unions
which are proscribed as unfair laborr practices under §S 8(a). (b) and (e). NLRA as
amended by the LMRA § 8(a), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1958); NLRA
as amended by the LMRA § 8(b), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as further amended by the
LMRDA § 704(a), 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1958), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 158(b) (Supp. II,1961); NLRA § 8(e) added by the LMRDA § 704(b), 73
Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. II, 1961).
34. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 249 (1959).
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having a unified and centralized system of administration which will
minimize the possibility of conflicts. This writer is of the opinion that
under the present federal administrative procedures the Court's majority
opinion will not discourage wrongdoing and will not contribute to the
effective administration of the law, although it will reduce conflicts.
It should also be observed that the Garmon case, all-embracing as its
language is, nevertheless leaves questions unresolved. For example, does the
Garmon case bar a state court action for damages after the National Labor
Relations Board has ruled that the subject is not protected by the federal
act? It would appear that the state court jurisdiction may vest after the
National Labor Relations Board has first declared that the subject matter
is not within the protection of the federal statute. The matter is debatable.
But it is obvious that there is state court jurisdiction if the subject matter
of the case is neither protected nor prohibited (ergo: not at all covered) by
the federal act. However, since the case may "arguably" be within the
coverage of the federal act, the state court may require the plaintiff to
first obtain a National Labor Relations Board declaration as to whether
or not the Board has jurisdiction over the subject matter. Clear as this
is, procedurally, there is no way of obtaining such an administrative determination without a full hearing on the merits. There is no procedure to advise
parties as to whether or not the Board has jurisdiction over any particular
subject matter. A hearing may take months before a decision is rendered
and there is no assurance even that a hearing will be held.
If a cause of action concerns activity which arguably may be within the
protection of the act (e.g., Justice Harlan thought that minority picketing
under the facts of the Garmon case may be protected by the federal act),
there is no procedure under the National Labor Relations Act whereby any
type of opinion or decision can issue stating whether or not the activity
is protected. This is due to the fact that unfair labor practice procedures
and hearings (as the name implies) are utilized only when the Office of
the General Counsel believes that there is substantial evidence of the commission of unfair labor practices, i.e., prohibited conduct. It is necessary
to determine as a preliminary issue whether or not employee activity is protected in order to reach the ultimate issue as to whether or not the employer
or union has engaged in prohibited conduct which interfered with the
protected employee activity. However, if there is no substantial evidence
of an unfair labor practice, there will be no hearing and no declaration as
to whether the activity at issue is or is not protected. In such a case there
can be no test for the determination of state court jurisdiction.
This writer is of the opinion that one or more Justices of the present
five-man majority of the Supreme Court will reconsider the wisdom of the
Garmon case and find points on which to distinguish it. This would most
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likely occur when the Board's procedures, as applied to the facts of a
particular case would preclude jurisdiction in both the Board and the state
courts, thus preventing any effective remedy.
Oddly enough, the same type of fact pattern as existed in the Garmon
case again came before the Court for review in an entirely different context.
In the Curtis Brothers case, 35 there was a minority union picketing for
recognition, and the question presented was whether or not the National
Labor Relations Act prohibited this conduct. The Board held that this
picketing was prohibited. The Supreme Court, not relying on the Board's
expertise as espoused in the Garmon case, held that the Board had improperly
extended its jurisdiction to embrace and prohibit that which Congress had
not prohibited.
Although the Curtis Brothers decision does not speak in terms of preemption, it is appropriate to discuss this case in that connection, because
the scope of subject matter which is pre-cmpted is, of course, co-extensive
with the scope of the protection and prohibitions of the act. In particular
the Curtis Brothers case held that the Board does not have authority or
discretion to prohibit strikes or picketing of which the National Labor Relations Board does not approve. The Board has no right to prohibit picketing
even when there was, in the Board's judgment, no justification for the use
of economic pressure. The Court held that to render a strike or picketing
unlawful, the objective sought to be accomplished by the use of the economic
pressure must be an objective specifically proscribed by the statute.
B. Florida Cases
The most recent applications by Florida appellate courts of the doctrine
of pre-emption are found in Wood Lathers Union v. Babcock Co.36 and
7
International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. Scherer 6 Sons, Ince
The Babcock case involved picketing of model homes that had been
built by a non-union contractor.38 The petitioner contended that the union
sought to have the contractor require its employees to join the union and
that this request if acquiesced in would result in a violation of the state
right-to-work law. 3 The court held that since the picketing was unaccompanied by violence and because the subject matter of the case was arguably
an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act, the state
court had no jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief.
35. NLRB v. Drivers Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).

[This case is referred to as

Curtis Brothers.]
36. 132 So.2d 16 (Fla. App. 1961).
37. 132 So.2d 359 (Fla. App. 1961).
38. See NLRA § 8(b)(7)(C) added by the LMRDA § 704(c), 73 Stat. 544

(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (Supp. II, 1961) which deals with this type of

picketing.
39. FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 12.
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In the Scherer case, the appellate court vacated a temporary injunction
issued against the enforcement of a contract between a union and apparel
manufacturers which provided that the manufacturers could not purchase
from non-union suppliers.40 The court held that although the contract
was a violation of Florida law, 4 ' the state jurisdiction had to yield because
it appeared that the activities complained of constituted an unfair labor
practice under the National Labor Relations Act.
C. Jurisdiction: Interstate Commerce
Prior to the passage of section 701 of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act,42 there existed a jurisdictional "no-man's land" in labor
cases. This phrase refers. to a situation in which no injunctive relief would
issue from state or federal authorities to remedy a legal wrong. The situation existed in those labor cases such as the Garmon case wherein the
employer's business affected interstate commerce, but not in sufficient
volume to meet National Labor Relations Board's standards for the exercise
of its injunction. In these cases, jurisdiction over the employer's business
was, nevertheless, considered to be pre-empted by the federal government
to the exclusion of the states. No injunctive relief was available from any
forum, and the dispute was said to be in the jurisdictional "no-man's land."
The doctrine was applied in the Florida cases of InternationalHod Carriers
v. Heftier Constr. Co.4 3 and InternationalBhd. of Elec. Workers v. Shires.44
The situation fortunately has now been remedied. Under section 701
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 45 the state court
has jurisdiction over labor dispute cases affecting interstate commerce so
long as the business does not meet the Board's standards for the exercise of
its jurisdiction. To assist any state court or the parties to a state court
proceeding to determine whether the business meets the Board's standards
for the exercise of its jurisdiction, the Board has now established an advisory
opinion procedure which may be invoked by the parties or by the state
court. 46 Thus, there is now a provision which enables the determination
of the question of whether the employer is engaged in a business of adequate
volume to effectuate interstate commerce jurisdiction. However, there is
still no expedient procedure available for a determination as to whether the
subject matter is within the Board's jurisdiction.

40.
U.S.C. §
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See NLRA § 8(e), added by the LMRDA § 704(b), 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29
158(e) (Supp. 11, 1961) which deals with this type of agreement.
FLA. STAT. § 542.05 (1961).
73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (Supp. II, 1961).
116 So.2d 30 (Fla. App. 1959).
123 So.2d 259 (Fla. App. 1960).
73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (Supp. II, 1961).
29 C.F.R. §§ 101.39-.43 (Supp. 1961).
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III.

UNION SECURrrY

Through the years employers and unions have each developed contractual clauses designed to protect what each considers to be in need of
protection; each developed clauses designed to preserve or obtain recognition
of that which was in their self-interest. In the case of such union clauses,
this article uses the trade parlance term "union security." The term refers to
clauses which affect the union's authority over the job or the employees.
In this sense, this section includes case law and statutory developments on:
(A)

Hot Cargo, Union Label and Subcontracting

(B)

Hiring Halls

(C)

The Right To Work and The Agency Shop.
A.

Hot Cargo, Union Label and Subcontracting

Needless to say, a union's security or power is materially enhanced if
a second union working for a secondary employer has the right to refuse to
handle goods coming from or going to the primary employer. This is a
form of secondary boycott. However, many employers when negotiating
their collective bargaining agreements had agreed (and the agreement was
not an unfair labor practice) to include a hot goods, struck goods, or hot
cargo clause which gives the secondary union just such a right. This was
one of the problems that Congress wished to correct in passing section
704(b) (commonly referred to as the "hot cargo section") of the Labor4
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 1
Similar in purport to the "hot cargo provisions" are the union label
clauses which enable the union to have the support of a second union, at
a secondary employer's premises, to assist in the establishment of union
standards or demands with a primary employer. These clauses exclude from
the work content of employees of the secondary employer any work on
goods which do not contain a union label.
The maintenance of union standards is also accomplished through subcontractor clauses. These are clauses which permit the primary employer
to subcontract work only to other employers who follow union standards.
Each type of clause deals with a very different subject and yet each
uses what is essentially the same idea. In each case, the employer's authority
47. For the policies behind the act see LMRDA § 2, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29

U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. II, 1961).

Section 704(b) was an amendment to the NLRA which established § 8(e). 73
Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. II, 1961). This section is also referred to in
§§ 8(b)(4)(A) and 10(1) of the NLRA (amended by the LMRDA §§ 704(a),
(d), 73 Stat. 542, 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4)(A), 160(1) (Supp. II, 1961))
and deals with secondary boycotts and injunctive relief. The section is intended to close
up this "loophole" in the statutory design to prohibit secondary boycotts.
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to assign, take in, or give out work is restricted. In other words, the common
denominator of hot cargo, union label and subcontracting clauses is that
they, in different ways, entail an agreement between an employer and a
union which limits the parties with whom the employer may do business.
Section 704(b) 4 8 contains language broad enough to cover all of these
situations.4"
The section provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
and a labor organization to enter into an agreement, express or implied,
under which the employer ceases or refrains, or agrees to cease or refrain
from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in the
products of any other employer or to stop doing business with any other
person. As a result of this section it is now illegal for a union to demand
a contractual clause requiring that subcontracting work only be given to a
union shop, because that would require the employer to agree to cease or
refrain from doing business with other (non-union) employers. A strike
to compel the employer to agree to such a clause would be a strike for an
unlawful objective and therefore be enjoinable. The intended effect of
this new section is to remove these clauses from the area of collective bargaining except in those industries specifically exempted by the proviso.50
A limited exception is provided for agreements made in the construction industry. The proviso states that the prohibitions of this section do
not apply to agreements in the construction industry relating to contracting
or subcontracting of work "to be done at the site." Therefore, it would
be proper for a general contractor to agree to use on the project only
subcontractors who have complied with the terms of the agreement between
the general contractor and the unions. On the other hand, it would be
illegal to agree that only goods containing a union label will be purchased
since these goods are fabricated off the site. These goods do not fall within
the proviso which is limited to the contracting or subcontracting of "work
to be done at the site."
A further proviso contains a similar exception for agreements made
in the apparel and clothing industry in which the employers are working
on the same goods, or if they are working on the same premises or form an
integrated process of production.5
48. See note 47 supra.
49. In a recent decision, the reconstituted Board has indicated that it will examine
the scope of prohibition of § 8(e) (NLRA § 8(e), added by the LMRDA § 704(b), 73
Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. II, 1961)) on a case by case basis. A
majority of the Board found no justification in the statute for the generalization of a trial
examiner that § 8(e) outlawed not only traditional hot cargo clauses in the transportation
industry, but also all similar clauses that "dircctlv or indirectly required an employer to
cease doing business by contract, subcontract, or in any other manner, with any other
person." Milk Drivers Union, 133 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (Nov. 25, 1961).
50. The Lithographers Union, 130 N.L.R.B. 985 (1961).
51. See International Ladies Garment Workers' Union v. Scherer & Sons, Inc., 132
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B.

Hiring Halls

The use of a hiring hall takes on many forms, although generally it is
a location maintained by a union wherein unemployed persons register for
referrals to jobs. It has been the subject of much comment and criticismfavorable and unfavorable. A hiring hall serves a particular use in short-term
employment industries (such as building and maritime) in that there is a
central place to find jobs and employees. This is particularly useful to an
out-of-town employer coming to an area in search of a large number of
craftsmen. At the same time the system enables the union to have a measure
of control over job opportunities which materially helps insure adherence
by members to the union's rules and standards.
Although hiring halls presumably operate for the benefit of
members who support them, and therefore operate upon a basis
is discriminatory, the congressional history nevertheless indicates that
halls are not intended per se to be proscribed as a means available
employer to obtain help.

union
which
hiring
to an

To effectuate the purposes of hiring halls, unions believed it necessary
to negotiate clauses requiring employers to use the hiring hall as an exclusive
source of employees. This, of course, would preclude an employer from
hiring job applicants who applied directly to the employer. In such cases
the employer had to refer the job applicant (who might not be a union
member in good standing) to the union to register, qualify and obtain a
referral. It therefore became necessary in an exclusive hiring hall arrangement for the union to register and refer members and nonmembers alike
without discrimination. Although this obviously was a form of encouragement to join or maintain membership in the labor organization, it is to be
noted that encouragement (or discouragement) of membership in a labor
organization is not an unfair labor practice unless it is accomplished by
means of discrimination.5 2 Notwithstanding this principle, the National
Labor Relations Board was of the view that unfettered control by unions
over hiring halls would lead to discriminatory practices. It therefore held
that hiring hall arrangements would be legal only if they contained adequate
safeguards to assure that the union's authority would not be abused. Thus,
the Board required in the Mountain Pacific, Seattle 6 Tacoma Chapters,
A.G.C.5 3 case that exclusive hiring arrangements include explicit provisions
that: (I) the selection of applicants for referral shall be without regard
to union membership requirements; (2) the employer shall retain the right

So.2d 359 (Fla. App. 1961) wherein the Florida Third District Court of Appeal applied
the doctrine of pre-emption to a fact pattern involving the exception to § 8(e) of the
NLRA (see note 40 supra). See text accompanying note 37 supra.
52. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 42-43 (1954).

53. 119 N.L.R.B. 883 (1958).
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to reject any applicant referred; and (3) the parties shall post for the applicant's inspection all provisions relating to hiring, including these safeguards.
For about three years, the Board sought to enforce these standards
upon employers and unions who had hiring hall arrangements. The principal enforcement method used by the Board was its remedy developed in
Brown-Olds. 4 As distinguished from the Board's usual remedy in discrimination cases, which was to award back pay to the one or few complainants
who were proven to have been discriminated against, the Board ordered,
in the Brown-Olds remedy that the employer and/or union (whichever was
the respondent) pay back all the dues and fees collected pursuant to the
unlawful hiring hall contract which were collected starting from the period
of six months prior to the filing of the charges.a 5
The Supreme Court on the same day issued two decisions, one rebuffing
the Board on its Mountain Pacific doctrine56 and the other on its Brown17
Olds remedy.
The requirement by the Board that hiring hall contracts include the
Mountain Pacific safeguards before the agreement would be considered
lawful was held by the Court to be without the Board's authority; by engaging in this practice, the Board was legislating. Since congressional history
shows that hiring halls were not per se illegal, the Board could not embroider
requirements, which Congress did not intend, onto hiring hall agreements.
Furthermore, to prove unlawful discrimination the government must supply
specific evidence of a purpose, motive or intent to discriminate or supply
sufficient evidence warranting a reasonable inference of such illegal purpose,
motive or intent and further show that the purpose of the discrimination
is to encourage or discourage union membership.5 8
In the same vein, the Court thought that the Brown-Olds remedy was
punitive, rather than remedial and therefore beyond the authority of the
Board. And again, the reason why the Board exceeded its authority was
related to a lack of evidence. Specifically, the Court stated that there was
no evidence that monies which were to be reimbursed to the members were
coerced by or resulted from the illegal practice in the case. There was no
evidence that the employees were coerced into joining or were kept from
quitting the union because of the illegal arrangement. The Court reasoned
that in circumstances in which the proposed remedy is not related in cause
54.
N.L.R.B.
55.
charges.

United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing, Local 231, 115
594 (1956). [This case is referred to as Brown-Olds.]
Six months is the statutc of limitations for the filing of unfair labor practice
See NLRA as amended by LMRA § 10(b), 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C.

§ 160(b) (1958).

56. Local 357, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 81 Sup. Ct. 835 (1961).
57. Local 60, Carpenters Union v. NLRB, 81 Sup. Ct. 875 (1961).
58. Local 357, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 81 Sup. Ct. 835 (1961).
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and .effect nor in financial value to the unfair labor practice involved, the
remedy is punitive and beyond the Board's authority. 59
C. The Right to Work and The Agency Shop
The substantive. law issue in Schermerhorn v. Local 1625, Retail Clerks
Int'l Ass'n,60 presently upon review before the Florida Supreme Court, is
whether or not the Florida right-to-work provision 6 ' proscribes any agreement
which requires an employee, as a condition of employment, either to join the
union and pay initiation fees and dues or else not to join the union, but
nevertheless pay an amount of money presumably the equivalent of dues and
fees. A clause providing for this arrangement is called an "Agency Shop"
clause.
The clause is resorted to by unions in Florida and in some other rightto-work states because. in these states employment cannot be conditioned
upon membership in a labor organization. More specifically, section 12 of
the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution provides:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on
account of membership or non-membership in any labor union, or
labor organization; provided, that this clause shall not be construed
to deny or abridge the right of employees by and through a labor organization or labor union to bargain collectively with their employer.
It is to be noted that Florida was the first state to pass a right-to-work
law, the constitutional amendment having been ratified in 1944. Florida's
choice of language was terse. As other state legislatures thought about the
problem, they embellished upon the basic idea of the right-to-work statute
and enumerated in more detail what was prohibited. The distinction in
language between subsequent statutes of other states which prohibit the
conditioning of employment upon the compulsory payment of money as
well as membership in a union, and the language of the Florida statute may
be a distinction in scope of prohibition; on the other hand, the distinction
in language may merely be the result of more careful draftsmanship which
comes after the passage and criticism of original legislation.6 2
Obviously, the right-to-work requirement can be interpreted merely to
59. Local 60, Carpenters Union v. NLRB, 81 Sup. Ct. 875 (1961).
60. Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. No. 61-7, Sept. 14, 1961. The court on motion of the
appellee entered an order staying its mandate and transferring the cause to the Supreme
Court of Florida, it having been made to appear that the supreme court had original
appellate jurisdiction. The orider further noted that if the supreme court takes jurisdiction,
then the mandate shall stand vacated without further order.
On October 18, 1961, the Florida Supreme Court on motion of the a pellant
entered an order holding that it had jurisdiction and setting the cause down for oral
argument. [The supreme court held that it had jurisdiction and that the agency shop
clause violates the Florida "right-to-work" provision. Fla. Sup. Ct. Case No. 31,465,
April 25, 1962. Ed.]
61. FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 12.
62. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 34.16 (Supp. 1961).
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bar conditioning or abridging employment upon literal "membership or
non-membership," or it can be interpreted in a broader fashion to bar
conditioning or abridging of employment upon factors directly or indirectly
related to membership or nonmembership, such as in the case at bar, the
payment by nonmembers of agency shop fees. It was the broader approach
which was taken by the Florida Third District Court of Appeal in its 1961
decision. 3
In a different, but interesting context, the National Labor Relations
Board has had several opportunities to interpret the meaning of the word
"membership" and in each case gave it a broad interpretation. 4 One of
the reasons for this was that the congressional history of the Taft-Hartley
Act shows that when the act says that employment can be conditioned upon
membership in a labor organization, 5 what Congress really intended as the
condition was not literal' membership, but rather the tendering of uniform
and reasonable initiation fees and periodic dues. This interpretation
followed from the fact that the federal act and its congressional history
reveal an acceptance and adoption of the unions' "free rider" argument.
The free rider argument should be explored because it is built upon
a premise which is binding upon unions in Florida and in all other states
notwithstanding right-to-work laws.
The free rider argument starts from the legal premise that under federal
law the union chosen by a majority of employees is the exclusive representative for all the employees in the unit 6 and must bargain for all the
employees without discrimination based upon factors of membership or
nonmembership. The union argument proceeds to reason that since the
law requires that the benefits of collective bargaining extend to all employees
in the unit and that since the union's expenses are incurred for the benefit
of all employees, it is only fair that all employees defray the expenses; that
those employees who do not help defray the expenses are looking for a
"free ride" and unfairly cast an economic burden upon the union members.
Congress in 1947 accepted the argument and gave the exclusive majority
representative the right to compel support from all employees within the
collective bargaining unit. 67
Congress at the same time that it adopted the "free rider" logic into
the federal act also provided that the states have a right to establish their
63. See note 60 supra.
64. General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (Sept. 29, 1961).
65. NLRA as amended by the LMRA § 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1958).
66. NLRA. as amended by LMRA § 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
159(a) (1958).
67. NLRA as amended by the LMRA § 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1958).
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own law (that is to say, the issue is not pre-empted) on this subject.
Specifically, section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act 68 provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution
or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in
which such execution or application is prohibited by State or
Territorial law.
Under the encouragement of section 14(b) there are right-to-work laws
in nineteen states. The argument in support of these statutes places more
of a premium upon individual rights and gives less weight to the rights of
the group (presumably a majority group). The argument presumes that
the individual's rights to avoid compulsory association should be paramount
to group rights arising out of collective bargaining. The argument proceeds
to reason that the union as a majority representative has legal responsibilities and costs that it and its members freely and voluntarily assumed;
that the concept of majority rule contained in the federal act should not
be used to involuntarily cast upon the minority a cost burden that they
have not desired nor chosen to assume; 69 that the idea of the non-joiner
reaping benefits is a speculative idea since there may or may not be benefits
derived; and finally that the individual should have a legal right to work
without having to extend support by membership, money, or in any other
way to an organization which he may oppose.
The underlying presumption of our federal statute is that the national
economy will be improved if workers are protected in their rights to engage
in collective bargaining. 7 0 To effectuate this end, the federal law subordinates individual rights when they clash with those principles necessary to
collective bargaining; yet, at the same time there are some individual rights
which are preserved.7 1 The area for the preservation of individual rights is
resolved on a case by case basis by the exercise of judicial discretion based
upon many factors including the language of the statute and the intent
of the legislature.
68. 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1958).
69. This argument presumes that employees who do not want to pay for collective
bargaining are only those who are opposed to the union. This is not necessarily so.
Frequently the desire of an employce not to pay for collective bargaining is the result of
the fact that he cannot afford to pay out any money that he is not legally obligated to
pay; and this type of employee may well have voted for or otherwise helped bring in
the union.
70. LMRA § 1, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
71. Note that the employee has an individual and qualified right to refrain from
concerted activity or collective bargaining and a similarly individual and qualified right to
present his own grievances to the employer. NLRA as amended by the LMRA §§ 7,
9(a), 61 Stat. 140, 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 159(a) (1958). Note also the distinctions drawn by the United States Supreme Court between individual employee rights
vis-a-vis union rights under collective bargaining agreements in Association of Westinghouse
Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
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Insofar as the language of the Florida Constitution is concerned, the
proviso,72 it can be argued, prohibits any construction of it which would
prohibit employees from bargaining collectively through their union for a
clause requiring agency fees from nonmembers. The contention would
be that to remove this subject matter from the scope of collective bargaining
would be an abridgenent of the employees' collective bargaining rights and
therefore an expressly prohibited construction and extension of the constitutional right-to-work provision.
On the other hand, if the probable intent of the draftsmen and state
legislators who advocated and passed this legislation is given more weight
than the exact meaning of each word, including the limitations of the proviso,
then it can be argued that the agency shop arrangement is within the
contemplated and intended meaning of the word "membership" and
therefore prohibited by the statute.
The Florida Supreme Court will have an opportunity when interpreting
the Florida statute to clarify the public policy of this state. 73 It should
be recognized that each side of the issue has equity and logic, and that
indeed is what makes the issue difficult for judicious decision.
IV.

STRIKES,

PICKETING

AND

BoYcors

A. Picketing for Organization or Recognition Purposes
1.

CURTIS BROTHERS

The importance of the Supreme Court's holding in the Curtis Brothers
case 74 is that it declared that the Board has no discretion or authority to
proscribe peaceful picketing or strikes which are not otherwise expressly
proscribed.
The exact question presented to the Court was whether peaceful picketing by a union, which did not represent a majority of the employees, to
compel recognition as the employees' exclusive bargaining agent was conduct
which restrained or coerced the employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7,75 and thus an unfair labor practice under section

72. "[P]rovided, that this clause shall not be construed to deny or abridge the right

of employees by and through a labor organization or labor union to bargain collectively
with their employer."

FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS §

12.

73. Bills were introduced in the Florida Legislature (S.B. 891, H.B. 2023, 1961
Sess., Fla. Legislature) designed to spell out the public policy of the state and implement
the right-to-work legislation. The bills died in committee.

74. NLRB v. Drivers Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960). [This case is referred to as
Curtis Brothers,]
75. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organization, to bargain through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in

other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except
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8(b) (1) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act.7 6 The following are the background
facts: the collective bargaining negotiations were followed by a strike
during which replacements were hired; a National Labor Relations Board
election was held and the picket line withdrawn after the union lost the
election twenty-eight to one; another picket line was subsequently established with signs containing language addressed to the public and to the
employees. Notwithstanding the purported informational and organizational purpose of the picketing, the Board concluded that the real purpose
of the picketing was to compel recognition. The Board entered a cease
77
and desist order.
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, Congress enacted the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 which added the
new section 8(b)(7) to the National Labor Relations Act 7 8 covering this
type of a problem. The Board contended in its argument to the Court
that the new section 8(b)(7) supplemented the power already conferred
by section 8(b) (1) (A).
The Board argued, in effect, that picketing causes economic harm to
the employer; that when the employer's business is thus harmed, it results
in a threat to the continued employment security of the employees and
therefore picketing constitutes an economic restraint and coercion upon
employees. The Board had to reason further, however, before concluding
that the restraint and coercion were the type proscribed by section
8(b) (1) (A). The Board went on to argue that since the purpose of the
picketing was to cause the employer to grant recognition to a minority
union, it sought to have the employer engage in an unlawful practice which
would have deprived employees of their statutory right to be represented
by a representative of their own choosing and of their right to refrain from
the exercise of this and other rights enumerated in section 7 of the act.
In these circumstances, the Board contended, there was no legal justification
for the economic pressure directed against the employer by the picketing;
ergo, the picketing was in violation of section 8(b) (1) (A).
The Board's construction of section 8(b)(1)(A) if upheld, would
have left it with considerable discretion to outlaw those union practices
which involve economic pressure and which in the Board's judgment sought

to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3)."

NLRA as amended by the LMRA § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
76. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (])(A) (1958). This section provides
in pertinent part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents . . . to restrain or coerce .
section 7 .... .

. .

employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in

77. Teamsters Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 232 (1957).
78. NLRA § 8(b)(7) added by the LMRDA § 704(c), 73 Stat. 544 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (Supp. II,1961).
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to accomplish objectives which were contrary to national labor policy as
understood and construed from the framework of the act generally. It
would have given the Board an authority to fill out the details which Congress found it most difficult to do. The labyrinth of factual patterns which
might be spun by different unfair labor practices can never be effectively
and fully dealt with unless the administering authority, be it the Board or
a labor court, has wide discretion.
Although the Supreme Court acknowledges the Board's authority in
this regard insofar as construing certain parts of the law are concerned,
the Court pointed to the congressional history and to section 13 of the
statute 7 and concluded that the Board had no authority to outlaw peaceful
strikes or picketing. The Court stated that section 8(b) (1) (A) gave the
Board no authority to limit peaceful picketing even if for objectives which
it thinks should be unlawful, and that the Board's authority to interfere
with, impede or diminish the right to strike or to affect the limitations
or qualifications on that right exists only when this authority is specifically
provided.
The Court then went on to point out that the subsequently enacted
section 8(b)(7)80 covers the subject and contains specific provisions and
limitations which will be the guideposts for determining the legality of
peaceful picketing for purposes of recognition.
2.

SECTION

8(b)(7)

The new section 8(b) (7) referred to by the Supreme Court in the
Curtis Brothers case is intended to discourage an uncertified union from

resorting to picketing as a method of forcing or requiring employees to organize or to compel an employer to recognize the union as the representative of
the employees. However, in seeking to accomplish this objective Congress did
not intend to prohibit, in certain circumstances, a union from picketing

to advise the public truthfully (including consumers) that an employer
does not employ members of, or have a contract with a labor organization.
This latter type of picketing is frequently referred to as "informational
picketing."
The section is susceptible to many and opposing interpretations.

The

Board decisions which previously issued 8' are now being re-examined by
the new Board members appointed by the present administration.
79. "Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed
so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to
affect the limitations or qualification on that right." LMRA § 13, 61 Stat. 151 (1947),

29 U.S.C. § 163 (1958).

80. See note 78 supra.

81. International Hod Carriers' Union, 130 N.L.R.B. 587 (1961) holds that
picketing for recognition is prohibited by § 8(b) (7) (C) (NLRA § 8(b)(7)(C) added
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One of the difficulties in interpreting and applying the section arises
from the fact that even informational picketing has as part of its objective, at
least in some degree or in the long run, obtaining recognition from the
employer. This is true except in the rarest of situations, e.g., grudge picketing designed not to correct that which is being complained of by the
picketing, but rather to cause economic ruin. Most cases in which the
language on the picket sign is "informational" rather than directed toward
organizational or recognition purposes, have as part of the fact pattern
some evidence to indicate that if the union were granted recognition and a
contract, the picketing would be terminated.
The type and quantum of evidence which will be required to prove
the prohibited or privileged status of the picketing will have a tremendous
bearing upon whether the congressional intent will be effectuated.
When the picketing is for the purpose of forcing employees to organize
or to compel the employer to recognize the union as the representative of
the employees, this picketing is unlawful unless a petition is filed within
a reasonable time; in this event an "expedited" election procedure is provided.8 2 The intent of the section is to provide the employer with a quick
method of determining whether or not he should recognize the union.
The section is not designed to encourage unions to picket so as to get a
faster election than is provided for through the usual election procedures.
To appreciate how the statute is designed to discourage picketing for
recognition or organizational purposes, reference should be made to the
impact of the Board's rules under section 9(c) (3)83 concerning eligibility
to vote in elections which determine union representation.
Section 9(c)(3) is used in any economic strike8 4 situation including
those which occur as a result of, or as a part of, section 8(b) (7) picketing.
In these cases, the general rule is that the employer has the right to hire
by the LMRDA § 704(c), 73 Stat. 544 (1959),

29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (Supp.

II, 1961) ) even though the union represents a majority of the employees and even though
the employer engaged in unfair labor practices. See also Chefs Union, 130 N.L.R.B. 543
(1961).
Local Joint Executive Bd. of Hotel &Restaurant Employees Union, 130 N.L.R.B. 570

(1961) holds that picketing of the public entrance of a cafeteria with signs asking the
public not to patronize does not come within the "publicity" exception because the union
also had recognition as an object or purpose of the picketing.
Teamsters Union, 130 N.L.R.B. 558 (1961) holds that picketing to force the
employer to bargain with the union is a violation of §, 8(b) (7) (C) even assuming
that recognition had been granted.
82. 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.73-.82 (Supp. 1961).
83. NLRA as amended by the LMRA § 9(c) (3), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), as further
amended by the LMRDA § 702, 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1958),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3) (Supp. II, 1961).
84. The term "economic strike" designates a strike not caused or prolonged by
unfair labor practices of the employer. It is to be distinguished from an unfair labor
practice strike (wherein the employer may not on a permanent basis hire replacements
for the strikers).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XVI

permanent replacements for the strikers. The replacements usually will vote
against the union. The strikers, on the other hand, after putting up with
the hardships of the strike may not be around to vote. The striker will
not be eligible to vote if he obtains other permanent employment or if his
job is abolished, or if he has been discharged for nondiscriminatory reasons."5
The determination of some of these eligibility issues is made through the
Board's challenged ballot procedure, and in that respect the "expedited"
election procedure may be prolonged. However, if the employer can resist
the picketing pressure for the period required to get a final determination
from the election procedures, the frequent result of section 8(b) (7) cases
will be that the minority union will be shown to have represented merely
a minority, and the majority union may have lost its majority because of
the eligibility of the replacement employees.
3.

FLORIDA LAW

The Florida labor law covering picketing is found in a line of cases
cited and applied in FontainebleauHotel Corp. v. Hotel Employees Union.86
Although this state law will have limited application in light of the subsequently developed doctrine of pre-emption, it is nevertheless interesting to
note the entirely different approach taken by the state law vis-a-vis the federal approach found in section 8(b) (7). For example, the state law does
not distinguish between "informational" picketing and other types; nor
is any election procedure available. The state law provides that picketing
is unlawful unless certain conditions precedent have been fulfilled:
1. The union must, prior to the picketing, establish to the employer
by evidence of a substantial character that it represents a number of his
employees.8 7
2. A union must, prior to picketing, advise the employer of the object
to be accomplished by the picketing and there must be an honest and
forthright attempt by the union to bring about negotiations.
3. There must be a bona fide labor dispute between the employer and
his employees.
4. A union must, prior to picketing, afford to the employer a fair
opportunity to engage in negotiation.

85. W. Wilton Wood, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 1675 (1960); Oatis Bros., Inc., 127
N.L.R.B. 1674 (1960); Helen Rose Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 1643 (1960).
86. 92 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1957), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Hotel Employees
Union v. Sax Enterprises, 358 U.S. 270 (1959).
87. Language in Fontainebleau and the predecessor cases implies or indicates that
Florida does not follow the doctrine of "exclusive majority representation" which is a
cornerstone of federal labor law; however, the issue has not been squarely presented to
the court.
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In Plager Bros. Brake Serv., Inc. v. Local 320, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,88
the Third District Court of Appeal issued a "per curiam affirmed" opinion
sustaining the refusal of the circuit court to issue a temporary injunction.
The facts of the case, as set forth in the dissent of Judge Carroll, establish
that the union did not comply with the conditions precedent to lawful
picketing as laid down by the Florida Supreme Court in the Fontainebleau
and predecessor cases. Of course, the lack of any opinion written by the
majority makes it impossible to comment upon what rationale caused it
to disagree with Judge Carroll. It is clear, however, that the law cited in
the dissent is the ruling case law of Florida.
B. Secondary Boycotts
1.

THE LOOPHOLE AND

THE AMENDMENTS

The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act made it an unfair labor practice for a
union to induce or encourage employees to strike when the objective is to
force any employer to cease doing business with any other person. This
prohibition is found in section 8(b) (4)8 9 which is commonly referred to as
the secondary boycott section. The purpose of the section was to shield
unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies which were
not of their own making. Notwithstanding this purpose, the only proscribed method of accomplishing the boycott was by inducement or encouragement of secondary employees to stop work. It was not unlawful for a
union to threaten or coerce a secondary employer directly to cease doing
business with the primary employer with whom the union had a dispute.
This interpretation of the section flowed from a literal application of the
statute. The interpretation, or the statute itself, contained this "loophole"
which the 1959 amendment 9" was intended to close.
The loophole was closed by providing that it is unlawful for a labor
organization to threaten, restrain or coerce any person when an objective
of this activity is to cause any person to cease doing business with any other
person. The statute is much stronger in its application to union efforts
addressed to employees to engage in secondary boycotts. The union need
not go so far as to use means which may be characterized as a "threat,
restraint or coercion." Specifically, the union cannot use, in the course of
a person's employment, means which induce or encourage any stoppage
of work to achieve a secondary boycott. On the other hand, a union is
permitted to induce and encourage a secondary employer or his higher level

88. 121 So.2d 36 (Fla. App. 1960).
89. NLRA as amended by the LMRA § 8(b)(4), 61 Stat. 141 (1947).
90. NLRA § 8(b) (4), as amended by LMRDA § 704(a), 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29

U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (Supp. 11,1961).
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supervisor9 1 to cooperate voluntarily and cease doing business with a primary
employer.
Concerning picket lines, it is to be noted that the current Board does
not construe the mere presence of a picket line at a secondary employer's
premises to be an illegal inducement or encouragement of employees to
make "common cause" with it and refrain from working behind it.2 But
the Board has held such a picket line to be a prohibited form of coercion
93
and restraint.
Concerning the union's right to appeal to the public, including consumers and union members, to boycott the primary employer's product,
this boycott may not be accomplished by picketing at the secondary
employer's premises. This picketing is expressly prohibited by a new proviso
to section 8(b) (4). The proviso does, for reasons which may have involved
constitutional considerations, conditionally permit other informational
activity short of picketing such as the union's use of handbills, unfair lists,
newspaper advertisements and radio broadcasts.94
2.

AT PRIMARY PREMISES

Union activity designed to accomplish a secondary boycott is prohibited
by section 8(b) (4) even if the activity occurs at the primary premises, but
this does not mean that any of the primary means which unions have traditionally used to press their demands on employers are prohibited.95 There
must be an accommodation of the "dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending
employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employers
and others from pressures in controversies not their own." 96 The Board
has through the years made the accommodation by usually regarding the
primary premises as a sanctuary so far as the legality of peaceful picketing
was concerned notwithstanding the existence of an object to stop employees
97
of secondary employers from doing their work.
91. Certain words in section 8(b) (4) (i) of the NLRA, as amended by the LMRDA
§ 70(a), 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i) (Supp. II, 1961) indicate
that a union cannot induce or encourage supervisors to stop work where an object is to
force an employer to cease doing business with another employer. The indication arises
out of the fact that a union cannot induce or encourage "any individual employed by any
person" to stop work for a proscribed object. Literally, supervisors fall within the meaning
of those words. However, the Board after examining the congressional history holds that
such inducement or encouragement is unlawful only if addressed to a supervisor who is
more closely aligned with rank and file employees than with management. Teamsters

Union, 130 N.L.R.B. 1438 (1961).
92. Perfection Mattress & Spring Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1961)
by Upholsterers Union, 132 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (July 11, 1961)).
93. Upholsterers Union, 132 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (July 11, 1961).

(reversed in part

94. Ibid.
95. N.L.R.B. v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
96. N.L.R.B. v. Denver Bldg. Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).

97. United Elec. Workers, 85 N.L.R.B. 417 (1949).
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By contrast, the past two years reveal an increased emphasis on the
"objective" behind union -picketing rather than looking so much at the
geography or premises involved. The new trend of thinking can be found
in the McJunkin s case which enunciated a "totality of effort" concept and
the General Electric"' case which dealt with a "reserved gate."
It is problematical whether the reconstituted Board will adhere to the
doctrine of the Mclunkin case; however, unless and until the Board reverses
the doctrine, the case constitutes an important interpretation of secondary
boycott law which, in certain circumstances, declares primary picketing to
be unlawful.
In the McJunkin case the Teamsters Union was not successful in organizing the employees of a pipe distributor. The union then resorted to
various tactics which indicated to the Board that the "total efforts" at
organizing the primary employees were through secondary boycott pressures.
The union wrote letters to several trucking companies advising them of the
dispute with the Mcjunkin Corporation and reminded the secondary
employers of the hot cargo clauses in their contracts which provided that
the secondary employees need not handle McJunkin's hot goods. Of the
ten entrances to McJunkin's property, the union picketed only a trucking
entrance not generally used by the primary employees. Employees of neutral
truckers were told on three occasions by union representatives at the primary
premises not to pick up or deliver and on one occasion these remarks occurred
at the terminal of a secondary or neutral trucker.
The Board held the picketing at the primary premises unlawful, because
the union's entire course of conduct was directed toward inducement and
encouragement of employees of neutral employers not to handle McJunkin's
goods. The Board stated if the totality of the union's efforts is intended
to accomplish a proscribed objective (a secondary boycott) by inducement
of secondary employees, then each particular inducement (including those
that occurred at the primary premises), being a component part of that
total effort, must be adjudged unlawful. 10 0
The "reserved gate" doctrine of the General Electric case is different
from the Mcjunkin case because, inter alia, in the General Electric case
there was a secondary employer on the primary premises and part of the
primary premises was set aside for the exclusive use of the secondary
98. Teamsters Union, 128 N.L.R.B. 522 (1960).
[This case is referred to as
Mclunkin.]
99. Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 123 N.L.R.B. 1574 (1959), enforced,
278 F.2d 282, rev'd and remanded, 81 Sup. Ct. 1285 (1961). [This case is referred to as
General Electric.]
100. The majority of the court of appeals refused enforcement of part of the Board's
order and held that peaceful primary picketing and its normal incidents cannot be forbidden
though the union has acted illegally elsewhere. Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 48 L.R.R.M.
2598 (1961).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XVI

employer. Specifically, General Electric reserved one of its five gates leading
into the plant for the exclusive use of independent contractors, their
employees and suppliers. Appropriate notices were posted. The independent contractors were doing a variety of tasks including construction
on new buildings, installing and repairing of ventilation and heating equipment and general maintenance work. The striking union which represented
General Electric's 7,000 employees nevertheless picketed all the gates including the reserved gate. The Board found the picketing of the reserved gate
unlawful in that the union's object in picketing the reserved gate was to
encourage employees of independent contractors to refuse to work and
thereby cause their employers to stop doing business with General Electric. 10 1
When the Supreme Court reviewed the case, 10 2 it held that the Board
correctly interpreted the statute by limiting the picketing to gates other
than the reserved gate. The Court approved these controlling considerations:
(1) There must be a separate marked gate exclusively used by employees of neutral secondary employers.
(2) The work done by the men who use the gate must be unrelated
to the normal operations of the employer.
(3) The work must be of a kind that would not, if done when the
plant were engaged in its regular operations, necessitate curtailing these
operations.
The Supreme Court cautioned, however, that this doctrine cannot be
used as an invasion on traditional primary activity of appealing to neutral
secondary employees whose work aids the employer's everyday operations.
It was on this latter point that the case was remanded, for the record showed
some (but not how much) use of the separate gate by employees of independent contractors who performed conventional maintenance work necessary to the normal operations of General Electric.
C.

jurisdictional Disputes

In 1947, the Congress wrote into the National Labor Relations Act
section 8(b) (4) (D),10 3 commonly referred to as the jurisdictional disputes
section. Its language is broad; specifically, it is an unfair labor practice for
a labor organization to induce or encourage employees to strike when an
object of this activity is to force an employer

101. In a later case the Board held that the reserved gate doctrine applied even where
the gate had been set up after the picketing had started. Chemical Workers Union, 126
N.L.R.B. 905 (1960), overruling In the matter of United Elec. Workers, 85 N.L.R.B.
417 (1949).
102. Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 81 Sup. Ct. 1285 (1961).
103. NLRA as amended by LMRA § 8(b) (4) (D), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as further
amended by the LMRDA § 704(a), 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D)
(1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (Supp. II, 1961).
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to assign particular work to employees in a particular trade, craft
or class, rather than to employees in another trade, craft or class,
unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for
employees performing such work.
Congress further provided a preliminary step in section 10(k)1 04 which
states that before passing on the unfair labor practice charge, the National
Labor Relations Board must first "hear and determine the dispute," unless
the parties "have adjusted or agreed upon methods of voluntary adjustment
of the dispute."
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in the Columbia Broadcasting
System'0 5 case, the Board normally confined itself in a section 10(k) hearing
to determine whether the employer's assignment of the work violated any
Board order, certification or collective bargaining contract. If there was
no violation, the Board would sustain the employer's right to assign the
work as he did by holding that the union was not entitled to strike or picket
to force the re-assignment of disputed work. The Board however, would
not make any affirmative award of the disputed work. Frequently, these
10(k) hearings determined nothing of any substantial value, for several
reasons, including the fact that the disputed job frequently was completed 1 6
by the time the 10(k) decision came down. In any event, the Board's
approach assured the employer the right to make his own work assignment
as long as he was not violating a Board certification or a collective bargaining
contract. The Board's approach was repudiated by the Supreme Court in
the Columbia BroadcastingSystem case.
The Supreme Court, in a rare unanimous opinion, held that the requirement of section 10(k) for the Board to "hear and determine the dispute"
requires a decision that one or the other of the competing groups is entitled
to the work in question and requires the Board to make an affirmative
award of the work.
It is true that this forces the Board to exercise under § 10(k)
powers which are broad and lacking in rigid standards to govern
104. NLRA as amended by the LMRA § 10(k), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
160(k) (1958).
105. NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs Union, 364 U.S. 573 (1961)
[This case is referred to as Columbia Broadcasting System.]
106. Concurrent with the 10(k) proceedings, the NLRB may seek a United States
district court injunction under § 10(1). NLRA as amended by the LMRA § 10(1).
61 Stat. 149 (1947), as further amended by LMRDA § 704(d), 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29
U.S.C. § 160(1) (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (Supp. II, 1961). Section
10(1) was the most forceful part of the Board's procedure in handling jurisdictional disputes. Quite apart from the Board procedures, the LMRA § 303(b), 61 Stat. 158
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1958) provides for a private damage action which may be
brought upon an 8(b) (4) (D) type violation. (See note 103 supra.) See International
Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 857 (1952).
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their application. But administrative agencies are frequently given
rather loosely defined powers to cope with problems as difficult
as those posed by jurisdictional disputes and strikes. It might have
been better, as some persuasively argued in Congress, to intrust this
matter to arbitrators. But Congress, after discussion and consideration, decided to intrust this decision to the Board. It has had
long experience in hearing and disposing of similar labor problems.
With this experience and a knowledge of the standards generally
used by arbitrators, unions, employers, joint boards and others in
wrestling with this problem, we are confident that the Board need
not disclaim the power given it for lack of standards. Experience
and common sense will supply the grounds for the performance of
10 7
this job which Congress has assigned the Board.
The Columbia Broadcasting System case construes the statute to give
the Board a broad power to arbitrate jurisdictional disputes. The potential
effects of this case are profound and will most surely tax the Board's wisdom.
V.

COLLECTIVE BARCAINING

(Tactics and Good Faith)

Through the years there has been much litigation. concerning the
methods and tactics employers and unions could legitimately use in collective bargaining to pressure the other into agreement. Although the Board
has at different times condoned or condemned certain bargaining tactics
of employers and unions, the Board's authority in this field and its view
of the government's role in collective bargaining must be re-examined in
light of the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Insurance Agent's Int'l
Union.08
The Prudential Insurance Company and the Insurance Agent's Union
were bargaining over the terms of a modification of an expired collective
bargaining agreement. The union, in order to put economic pressure on
the company, engaged in various activities, which in large measure were
unprotected. The employees, among other things, refused to solicit new
business, or to comply with reporting, clerical and other procedures and
duties, reported late to offices, absented themselves from business meetings,
and at times picketed and solicited customers' signatures on petitions
directed to the company. The good faith of the union's conduct at the
bargaining table was not questioned.
The Board held that the union, by resorting to these unprotected
activities, was per se bargaining in bad faith. The court of appeals refused
enforcement of the Board's order, and the Board requested certiorari from
the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court thought that the Board took an erroneous view
107. NLRB v. Radio &Television Broadcast Eng'rs Union, 364 U.S. 573, 583 (1961).
108. 361 U.S. 477 (1960), noted in 15 U. MiAMr L. REv. 215 (1960).
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of collective bargaining. The Court held that "there is simply no inconsistency between the application of economic pressure and good faith
collective bargaining." 10 9 This is true, even though the economic pressure
tactics are unprotected or may be subject to public disapproval or are not
traditional. The Board is not to be an arbitrator of the sort of economic
weapons the parties may use. In determining whether or not an employer
or union acts or bargains in good faith, the Board errs in inferring bad faith
merely because of the use of on-the-job harassing tactics. The Court goes
on to state that although' the Board has the power to prohibit a strategem
or device to evade the policies of the act, even when the stratagem or device
is not expressly prohibited, this was not the Board's approach in this case.
It is clear here that the Board has moved into a new area of regulation
which Congress has not committed to it.
Abstract logical analysis might find inconsistency between the
command of the statute to negotiate toward an agreement in good
faith and the legitimacy of the use of economic weapons, frequently
having the most serious effect upon individual workers and productive enterprises, to induce one party to come to the terms desired
by the other. But the truth of the matter is that at the present
statutory stage of our national labor relations policy, the two factors
-necessity for good-faith bargaining between parties, and the availability of economic pressure devices to each to make the other
party incline to agree on one's terms-exist side by side. 110
VI.

ARBITRATION

Ever since the Supreme Court declared that the federal courts have
jurisdiction, under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act,"' to order specific
performance of arbitration agreements contained in collective bargaining
contracts, 112 litigants have increasingly been arguing about the extent of the
court's authority to determine whether the underlying grievance or dispute,
in each case, is arbitrable, and how far the court should inquire into the
merits of the grievance to determine the issue.
The question was dealt with in two recent decisions of the Supreme
Court." 3 A third decision, issued on the same day, dealt with the enforceability and the requirements of the arbitrator's award. 114 The Court held,
109. Id. at 494.

110. Id. at 489.
111. "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between

any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties." LMRA §, 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
112. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
113. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
114. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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in an opinion written by Justice Douglas, 115 that in actions under section 301
for specific performance of agreements to arbitrate, the function of the
courts should be limited to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by contract, and that
the courts should not undertake to determine the merits of the grievance
under the guise of interpreting the arbitration clause of the contract. The
Court stated that arbitration should be ordered "unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in
favor of coverage.""" The Court explained further that the courts have no
right to weigh the merits of the grievance, or to consider whether there is
equity in the claim or whether there is particular language in the contract
that will support the claim; for it was the arbitrator's judgment, not the
court's, that was bargained for in these matters.
The dissent of Justice Whittaker' 1 7 emphasized that the majority
opinions written by Justice Douglas used broader language than was warranted and established new concepts of law; that rather than have presumptions in favor of the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to decide arbitrability, the
test in ordering arbitration should be: Did the parties in their contract
manifest by plain language their willingness to submit the issue in controversy to the arbitrator? If so, then the arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction
of the issue, and the courts, absent fraud or the like, must respect that
exclusive jurisdiction and cannot interfere. But if they did not, then the
courts must exercise their jurisdiction, when properly invoked, to protect
the citizen against the attempted use by an arbitrator of pretended powers
actually never conferred.
A concurring opinion emphasized that the arbitration promise is itself
a contract and that parties are free to make that promise as broad or as
narrow as they wish, and that the wording of that promise determines
whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute and also
indicates the extent to which the courts may or may not make an examination into the merits.
There is no doubt that these Supreme Court decisions have contributed
much to facilitate and expedite the arbitral process. However, in arguing
a close case it should be relevant to point out that Justice Douglas' broad
language is not supported by a majority of the Court."'

115.
116.
117.
118.
joined in
Brennan.

United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
Id. at 582-83.
Id. at 585.
justice Black took no part; justice Whittaker dissented, and Justice Frankfurter
the observations contained in the concurring opinion of Justices Harlan and

